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Cathrine Bjørnholt Michaelsen
Reversals of the Mirror Stage 
Lacan and Blanchot on 
the Precariousness of Reality
This essay offers a reflection on the porosity of borders, edges, frames, 
thresholds, and other liminal phenomena. The aim of this reflection is 
to trace out the limits of the subject who utters ‘I’ and the principles 
of its reality, which Lacan in his seminar L’éthique de la psychanalyse 
characterizes as “essentially precarious”1. It will be argued that the ex-
posure to such precariousness of reality may cause a certain ‘reversal of 
the mirror stage,’ which strips the subject of its ability to speak in the 
first person singular. Moreover, it is suggested that indications of such 
a reversal may be found at certain limit points of Lacan’s psychoana-
lytic discourse at which it brushes up against Maurice Blanchot’s writ-
ing of the neuter. In pursuit of these liminal points, the main body of 
the essay is divided into three sections each of which takes as its point 
of departure three key sentences from Lacan’s tenth seminar L’ango-
isse (1962-1963). The effort is to bring each of these sentences into a 
conversation (infinite no doubt) with different aspects of Blanchot’s 
writing of the neuter as these are put forward mainly in his L’espace 
littéraire (1955). Before entering into this conversation, however, a 
brief remark on the ‘mirror stage’ and a preliminary indication of its 
reversal is called for. 
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I. THE MIRROR STAGE AND ITS REVERSAL
In his 1949 essay “Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction 
du Je,” Lacan introduces his famous notion of the mirror stage in or-
der to designate one of the early stages in the imaginary formation 
of the subject who can say ‘I.’ During this stage the infant proceeds 
from the sensations of a fragmented ‘body-in-pieces’ [corps morcelé] 
towards the identificatory image of itself, which orthopedically orga-
nizes its body into a more or less coherent whole2. This early organi-
zation of the body is decisive to the formation of the subject insofar as 
the unifying image of the mirror stage provides the support by which 
the infant eventually becomes able to stand erect in “an armor of an 
alienating identity that will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s 
entire mental development”3. Moreover, it is because of this alienat-
ing armorization of the subject, which masks its originary duplicity, 
that the subject will also become capable of employing the personal 
pronoun ‘I’4. 
In a preliminary manner, we may therefore say that the reversal of 
the mirror stage can be conceived as a disorganizing and decomposing 
return to or of what had initially been masked, that is, the duplicitous 
origins of the I. In this way, the subject is exposed to the precarious 
limits of its own reality and to what had to be covered over and made 
to disappear in order for this reality to appear in the first place. Yet, 
as we shall come to see in the course of this essay, this exposure to 
the precariousness of reality also entails that the subject comes face 
to face, so to speak, with the appearance of its own disappearance. To un-
fold this preliminary suggestion, I shall argue that the reversal of the 
mirror stage, which I am here attempting to delineate, may be read as 
a displaced echo of Freud’s psychoanalytic leitmotif “where It was, I 
must come to be [Wo Es war, soll Ich werden]” 5.i Whilst admitting the 
manifold ways to interpret Freud’s imperative, it is my suggestion that 
i Freud first articulated his imperative in the 1932 lecture, “Die Zerlegung 
der psychischen Persönlichkeit” subsequently published in Neue Folge Der 
Vorlesungen Zur Einführung in Die Psychoanalyse in 1933. In the Standard 
Edition, Freud’s sentence is translated as “Where id was, the ego shall 
be.” Even though the translator’s choice of wording refers back to Freud’s 
1923 essay on “Das Ich und das Es,” it appears problematic since, as Lacan 
stresses in “La chose freudienne,” in 1932 Freud abstains from employing the 
definite articles. This is so, Lacan further argues, because whereas Freud aim 
in the 1923 article was to organize his new topology of the psychic apparatus 
by upholding a “fundamental distinction” between ‘the It’ and ‘the I,’ Freud’s 
interest in 1932 rather concerns the locus where I must come to be in the 
place of It , that is, the locus of the Other. Cf. Lacan 1995: 347-8/417-18.
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one way by which the ‘I’ comes to be where ‘It’ was, is precisely by 
way of the ex-posure of the subject to the locus of its own vanishing 
point, which, following Lacan, also demarcates the “vanishing point 
of any reality that might be attained”6. Rather than simply overturn-
ing a hierarchical order by which the It would come to overthrow and 
reassume the position of the ego, however, the reversal of the mirror 
stage brings about a certain displacement of the subject in relation 
to It. This displacement causes anxiety in the I, which, according to 
Freud, is the ‘proper locus of anxiety’ [die eigentliche Angststätte] see-
ing as it unsettles the very limits of this locus by exposing it to the 
threat of disorganization and dissolution lying at its abyssal founda-
tions7. Keeping these preliminary remarks on Freud, the It, and the 
uncanny in mind, let us therefore proceed to the first key sentence from 
Lacan’s tenth seminar, which states that “anxiety is not without object 
[l’angoisse n’est pas sans objet]”8. 
II. THE ODD OBJECT OF ANXIETY 
In arguing that anxiety is not without an object, Lacan interrupts a 
certain trajectory of thought according to which anxiety in contrast 
to fear is considered to be objectless.ii In reading Lacan’s irruptive 
sentence, however, we should note that the double negative figuring 
in “anxiety is not without object” does not arithmetically turn into a 
positive statement claiming that anxiety has an object, which may 
in turn be grasped in its presence and appropriated by the anxious I. 
Rather, the double negative is an instance of what Lacan in his seven-
teenth seminar on the reverse side of psychoanalysis calls “le pas-sans” 
(1969–1970: 58/65). The ‘not-without’ is a term that Lacan employs 
in various contexts as a double negative which disrupts and undoes the 
very opposition between presence and absence and, along with it, the 
entire structure that the dialectic play between these opponents up-
holds. That is, to speak with both Heidegger and Lacan, the presenc-
ii Freud’s position within this trajectory is ambiguous seeing as he, 
in some places, refers to anxiety as “a quality of indefiniteness and lack of 
object [Unbestimmtheit und Objektlosigkeit]” (Freud 1926: 164-165/197–
198), whereas he, in other places, considers anxiety to be more of a response 
to the threat of losing its object (cf. Freud 1926: 108/137). There are, however, 
exceptions to the trajectory of objectless anxiety, one of which Lacan notes 
is Kierkegaard who, in his Concept of Anxiety writes neither that anxiety is 
anxious of losing its object, nor that it is without an object, but rather that “the 
object of anxiety is a nothing [et Intet]” (Kierkegaard 1844: 380/77).
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ing-absencing of the being [sein/Sein] by which everything that comes 
to exist is nurtured.iii
 In this regard, Lacan is of course pleased by the circumstance 
that sein, which in French can mean both breast, womb and heart, in Ger-
man designates being, which is precisely what the subject loses upon its 
inscription into the existence of symbolic desire, which, according to 
Lacan, is always the desire of the other in the double genitive. Seeing 
as Lacan underlines that the structure of desire, as supported by phan-
tasy ($ ◊ a),iv and the structure of anxiety resemble each other to the 
point even that they are “well and truly the same” (Lacan 1962–1963: 
3/11), we shall therefore take a brief look at this phantasmatic struc-
ture in order better to discern what occurs in anxiety.
According to Lacan, desire is structured by a fundamental lack 
emerging as the inaccessible residue of an originary ‘cut’ [coupure] that 
instigates the desiring subject as always already split or divided in it-
self. As Lacan explains in his second seminar, “[d]esire is a relation of 
being to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly speaking. It isn’t 
the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being exists” 
(1954–1955: 223/263). Desire thus sustains itself by continually trying 
to fill out the void place in existence left behind by this original cut off 
being, which opens the subject of desire to a range of partial objects 
that will never be it (Cf. Lacan 1972–1973: 126f./158f). Put simply, if 
the (m)other did not show signs of lacking something, and therefore 
also of desiring something, the infant would never let go of its being-
with-the-breast in its desire to become the object of the (m)other’s 
unknown desire. Indeed, in order to come into existence, the subject 
must turn the originary loss of the being-breast into an operative 
cause of its own desire, which is why Lacan in his eleventh seminar 
says that “[t]he phantasy of one’s death, of one’s disappearance, is the 
first object that the subject has to bring into play in this dialectic [i.e. 
of absence and presence]” (1964: 214/195). 
iii In his lectures on Hölderlin’s hymn Der Ister, Heidegger argues that this 
overturning or displacement of the dialectic play between presencing and 
absencing opens unto an experience of the essence [Wesen] of uncanniness 
[Unheimlichkeit], which he describes as a “presencing in the manner of an 
absencing [die Anwesung in der Art einer Abwesung]” (1942: 75/ 92). 
iv The algorithm of phantasy $ ◊ a can be read as follows: the barred 
subject ($) through alienating identification and separation desires (◊) the 
object (a), which it will never succeed in obtaining. Therefore, Lacan states 
that “the path of the subject passes between the two walls of the impossible” 
(1964: 167/152).
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In bringing up the phantasy of one’s own death or disappearance 
as the first object of desire, Lacan is of course referring to the Fort:da 
game as described by Freud in “Jenseits des Lustprinzips.” 
In contrast to Freud, however, Lacan does not interpret the 
two acts of the game in which the infant repeatedly throws away and 
pulls back the wooden reel on a string as a mise-en-scène of the moth-
er’s departure and return. Instead, Lacan considers this ‘Freudian 
Thing’ with which the infant plays to represent his own disappearance 
brought about by the absence of the (m)other’s attentive gaze, which 
functioned as the matrix inducing his being with presence. In other 
words, after the separation from the (m)other the infant plays his own 
remains like an abject thing, which, as Lacan says, “vacillates in a split 
of the subject” (1964: 29/28). Borrowing a term from Ernest Jones, 
Lacan refers to this dialectic game of absencing and representing as 
the aphanisis or fading of the subject in order to designate how “the 
subject manifests himself in this movement of disappearance that he 
[i.e. Jones] describes as lethal”9.
It is important to notice, however, that what matters to Lacan is 
not so much whether or not this lost being can be said to have ever ‘ac-
tually’ been present or not. Rather, what matters is that the desiring 
subject is conditioned by this lacking ground of being in order to come 
to ex-sist in the first place, and that the myth of the immemorial loss 
of this being is inscribed only belatedly, that is, after the fact of the 
originary cut—après coup(ure).v In other words, just as there was noth-
ing repressed before repression and vice versa, insofar as the Urver-
drängung names the immemorial instigation of both at the same, yet 
anachronic, time, so there was no ‘authentic’ real of the drives before 
the alienating reality of symbolic desire, since neither emerges before 
the signifying cut that separates them both. As Lacan formulates it in 
1956: “No prehistory allows us to efface the cut brought about by the 
heteronomy of the symbolic”10.
v  In his rendition of the neurological etiology of consciousness from 
“Jenseits des Lustprinzips,” Freud writes of an original ‘belatedness’ 
[Nachträglichkeit], which produces an immemorial past according to 
which “consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace [an Stelle der 
Erinnerungsspur]” (Freud 1920: 25/25). In other words, consciousness arises 
as the substitute, not for a memory of something once present, but for the 
trace of a memory, which means that consciousness develops as the memory 
of something that remains immemorial. For a brilliant discussion of the 
possible relation between the figure of the immemorial and the psychoanalytic 
discourse of the unconscious, see Lyotard 1988: 11ff. 
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As such, Lacan repeatedly emphasizes that the object of desire is 
not in front of but behind the desiring subject as an originally lost cause 
or as “the phantom known as the cause”11, which cannot be recuper-
ated by a representation. On this view, what Lacan in contrast to the 
various partial objects of desire calls objet petit a designates the remind-
er of an immemorial remainder, which is that formless part of itself 
from which the subject is cut off in order to come into reality. From 
its very inscription into reality, this abjected cause therefore remains 
inaccessible to the subject as other than an originary lack—albeit a 
lack that is constitutive of its subjective reality. In a note to his essay 
“D’une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psy-
chose,” Lacan describes the mechanism as follows: “$, the barred S of 
desire, props up the field of reality here; and this field is sustained only 
by the extraction of object a, which nevertheless gives it its frame”12.
What happens in anxiety, however, is that the object that was 
always already lost behind desire now comes to the fore and enters the 
frame of reality, which causes a disturbance of the mirror stage whose 
functioning depends precisely on the extraction of this anarchic ob-
ject. In anxiety, the specular image thus ceases to function as a mech-
anism of alienating identification, and instead becomes a mechanism 
of auto-dissimulation whereby, as Lacan says in his second seminar, 
“this imaginary relation itself reaches its own limit, and the ego fades 
away, dissipates, becomes disorganized, dissolves”13. Hence, anxiety is 
a signal that threatens to reverse the organization of the imaginary I, 
whereby the subject becomes re-consumed by that part of itself, which 
was originally abjected in order for it to position itself as such. Allow 
me to reproduce a lengthy passage from the tenth seminar in which 
Lacan very clearly unfolds what is at stake in this threat of reversal: 
Don’t you know that it’s not longing for the maternal breast that 
provokes anxiety, but its imminence? […]. It is not, contrary to 
what is said, the rhythm of the mother’s alternating presence and 
absence. The proof of this is that the infant revels in repeating 
this game of presence and absence. The security of presence is the 
possibility of absence. The most anguishing thing for the infant 
is precisely the moment when the relationship upon which he 
has established himself, of the lack that turns him into desire, is 
disrupted, and this relationship is most disrupted when there’s no 
possibility of any lack14.
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On this view, desire only functions against the backdrop of an origi-
nary loss and its perpetual lack, wherefore anxiety must be conceived 
of as a signal of “the failure of support that lack provides”15. In other 
words, Lacan redoubles the anxiety of losing by turning it into an anx-
iety of losing lack. 
At this liminal point, we are thus approaching an initial sense of 
how the psychoanalytic discourse of Lacan tangentially comes into 
contact with the neutral writing of Blanchot, who in his L’écriture du 
désastre writes of an originally “lost loss [la perte perdue]”16, designat-
ing the unsettling disclosure that there never was anything to lose in 
the first place. This initial sense of contact between the two authors 
should gain more of a contour if we turn to L’espace littéraire where 
Blanchot discerns a difference between two kinds of lack: on the one 
hand, an operative lack of being, which Blanchot associates with the 
dialectics of negativity in Hegel and which in Lacan’s psychoanalytic 
discourse would function as the support of desire; on the other hand, 
an inoperative being of lack, which disrupts the Hegelian dialectics and 
provokes anxiety in the Lacanian subject. Blanchot renders the differ-
ence as follows:  
When being lacks, when nothingness becomes power, man is 
fully historical. But when being lacks, is there a lack of being? 
When being lacks, does this mean that this lack owes nothing to 
being? Or rather does it mean perhaps that the lack is the being 
that lies deep in the absence of being – that the lack is what still 
remains of being when there is nothing? When being lacks, it 
is still only profoundly concealed. He who approaches this lack 
is approached by the being which the absence of being makes 
present. This is no longer concealed being, but the being of this 
concealment: dissimulation itself.17
In an attempt to read Blanchot’s distinction of lacks together with 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic discourse, we could perhaps say that when the 
originary lack of being, which operates as constitutive and supportive 
of the frame of reality, comes to be lacking, this frame in turn becomes 
inoperative, which causes great anxiety to the subject who depends on 
its framing in order to form a coherent image of itself and be able to 
say I. According to Lacan, this means that anxiety is neither without 
an object nor about losing an object; rather, it is anxious about gaining 
an object, or better, the object called object little a insofar as this gain 
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threatens the very existence of the anxious I who would no longer be 
there to receive this gift since It would already have displaced or dis-
persed its place. 
Hence, although Lacan in many respects alters Heidegger’s in-
terpretation of anxiety, a striking similarity in their languages never-
theless remains, as when Heidegger in Sein und Zeit writes that what 
anxiety uncannily forebodes is that “it is already ‘there’—and yet no-
where. It is so near that it is oppressive and takes away one’s breath—
and yet nowhere”18. According to Lacan, this imminence of something 
that remains nowhere, a nearness not of a presence but rather of the 
absence of presence, a hyper-proximity of the absence of presence, is 
nevertheless experienced as claustrophobic to the point of asphyxia-
tion thereby repeating the anxiety, which dates back to the very trau-
ma of birth.vi This suffocating hyper-proximity brings us to the second 
key sentence from Lacan’s tenth seminar.
III. ON THE LACK OF LACK AND SEEING 
ONESELF DISAPPEAR 
The second key sentence from Lacan’s tenth seminar states that what 
provokes anxiety “is always the there is no lack [c’est toujors le ça ne 
manque pas]”19. Recalling that ça is Lacan’s translation of the Freud-
ian Es, the phrase may be read both as ‘it is not lacking’ and as ‘there is 
no lack.’vii Putting these two possible translations together, one could 
therefore read Lacan’s sentence in a third way, namely, as stating that 
‘where lack is not, there It is.’ This third translation points us in the 
direction of both Lacan’s assertion that “there is no lack in the real [il 
n’y a pas de manque dans le reel]”20, and Blanchot’s engagement with the 
‘impersonal’ designating precisely what remains when ‘there is [il y a] 
nothing’21. In what follows, I will attempt to qualify this possible in-
termingling of Lacan’s encounter with the lack of lack and Blanchot’s 
experience of what remains in the absence of being. 
Given that Lacan refers to the originally lost object as the very 
cause engendering the phantasy that sustains desire in its metaphoric 
vi  In Lacan’s view, the crux of the birth trauma does not pertain to the 
separation of the infant from the mother, as Freud would have it, but rather to 
the separation of the infant from itself due to the intrusion of alterity, that is, 
“the inhalation, into oneself, of a fundamentally Other environment” (1962–
1963: 327/378).
vii  Price and Gallagher translates Lacan’s sentence as “there’s no lack” 
(Price 2014: 54) and “it is not missing,” (Gallagher 2002: 47), respectively. 
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and metonymous relation to the objects that are never It, the return of 
the object that would be It threatens to destroy the very composition 
of desire. This is why Lacan says that “desire is a defense, a defense 
against going beyond a limit in jouissance”22. As already mentioned, 
anxiety emerges when something, and Lacan stresses that this could be 
anything whatsoever, appears in the place of lack. Put differently, any-
thing can trigger your anxiety in that it does not really matter what ap-
pears in the place of lack but rather that something appears there. To 
put it in the terms of Blanchot’s distinction between two lacks: When 
the lack of being comes to be lacking, it is the very being of lack that 
appears. However, since it is the lack of being that sustains the frame 
of reality, this disastrous turning point occurs at a threshold where 
the absence of presence turns into a presence of absence and nothing 
happens to appear. In Blanchot’s words, this catastrophe designates the 
“apparition of ‘everything has disappeared’”23. My suggestion is that 
something similar to such an apparition of disappearance takes place 
in Lacan’s tenth seminar, namely, in what I have referred to as a rever-
sal of the mirror stage. This suggestion may be clarified by focusing on 
two phenomena of Lacan’s text: ‘the frame’ and ‘the double.’ We will 
begin with the frame.
According to Lacan, anxiety exposes its subject to the realization 
that “a mirror doesn’t extend to infinity”24, that is, to the fact that a 
mirror has limits and borders up against something, which remains 
unseen ‘beyond’ or ‘behind’ its frame, but which is nevertheless op-
erative in the constitution of a framed vision. Borrowing a term from 
Derrida (who borrows it from Kant), we can therefore say that the 
frame is an instance of the parergon, which is to say that the frame is 
“neither simply outside nor inside”25, but rather marks a threshold 
between inside and outside, which at the same time establishes and de-
stabilizes the very status of this dichotomy.
As we have seen, Lacan renders the field of reality as being sus-
tained by the extraction of something that must remain on its ‘out-
side’ in order to maintain its frame. In anxiety, however, this ‘outside’ 
appears ‘within’ the frame of reality thus endangering the very func-
tion of framing. This is one reason why Lacan states that “anxiety 
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is framed”26.viii In anxiety the borders of reality are exposed in their 
porosity insofar as they are not uncontaminated by that against which 
they are bordered up, that is, ‘the outside.’ Accordingly, anxiety dis-
closes the fact that reality is not simply a ‘naturally’ given foundation 
on which we all have our bearings, but rather an artificial and symbolic 
construction. This, however, does not entail that the framed ‘reality’ 
is impervious to the ‘real,’ which was necessarily extracted from this 
construction, but which might return to threaten its framework. In 
Lacan’s view, this is why one of the most significant insights of Freud-
ian psychoanalysis is precisely the realization that when it comes to 
the anxious the issue is not that they are disturbed by figures of their 
own imagination; rather, “the disturbing thing is that, in the unreal, 
it’s the real that torments them”27. 
On this view, anxiety is the signal or the ‘premonition’ [presen-
timent] of that which cannot be seen inside the frame of reality but 
which nevertheless conditions it from elsewhere; that is to say, it is a 
premonition of the spectral real that does not allow for specular rep-
resentation.ix However, there is a moment of ‘catastrophic reversal’ 
where this premonition of anxiety suddenly turns into the uncanny 
and spectral apparition of this ‘elsewhere’ situated inside the frame as 
its inappropriable outside. The liminal phenomenon of the uncanny 
is precisely the appearing inside of what should have remained on the 
outside in order to uphold and sustain the untainted separation and di-
alectical relation between inside and outside. As Lacan explains: “Anx-
iety is the appearance, within this framing, of what was already there, 
at much closer quarters, at home, Heim. It’s the occupant [l’hôte]”28. As 
such, the object, that anxiety is not without, concerns the clandestine 
and uninvited guest who has always already arrived, not only outside 
at the door, but already inside the house of the supposed host, and 
viii  In light of the above, I find Derrida’s claim in “Pour l’amour de Lacan” 
that Lacan, along with the failure to take notice of the literary structure 
of narration, also misrecognizes—and here Derrida’s choice of the word 
méconnaissance is undoubtedly not a fortuitous one—‘the frame,’ and 
in particular its parergonal effects, to be somewhat odd, considering the 
frequent references to frames and framings, not to mention all the other 
liminal phenomena such as borders, rims, and thresholds swarming the texts 
of Lacan. Cf. Derrida 1996: 59/77. See also Johnson 1977.
ix  In his talk at the Congress of Rome in 1974, Lacan designates anxiety 
as “the paradigmatic symptom of every arrival of the real” (1974: 7). The 
spectrality of this arrival is alluded to when Lacan in his eleventh seminar 
describes the real as that which is “neither being, nor non-being” and yet 
“always comes back [revient] to the same place” (1964: 30/32; 49/49).
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who, as Lacan says, has “already slipped into the hostile”29. Although 
Freud speaks of a certain “expectancy” or “preparedness” in relation 
to anxiety30, Lacan maintains that “the magisterial German Unheimli-
che, presents itself through little windows” and always “suddenly, all at 
once [tout d’un coup]”31.
Furthermore, the strange appearance of the uncanny guest or 
host who was already there within the frame of reality leads us to 
the figure of the double, which represents precisely one of those long 
known yet immemorial secrets of the home that can neither be re-
membered nor forgotten. This is because, in the mirror stage the sub-
ject identifies itself as one only by identifying with the mirror image 
of the imaginary other, which means that it must retrieve its alienated 
self-identity outside of itself in order to obtain an inside in the first 
place. However, this originary duplicity is masked by the misrecog-
nition that, according to Lacan, is inherent to recognizing oneself. 
Anxiety, however, signals a reversal of this movement of identificatory 
alienation whereby “the constitution of the specular image shows its 
limit […] and marks the limit of the illusory aspect of the world of 
recognition, the one I have been calling the stage [la scène]”32. 
Hence, anxiety is when I look into the gaze of the mirroring oth-
er and what is reflected back is no longer what I took to be my own 
image but instead a “passage from the specular image to the double 
that escapes me”33. As Lacan stresses in relation to the later work of 
Maupassant, anxiety emerges when one is no longer able to see the 
image of oneself in the mirror, but instead begins to discern some-
thing else, something which can only be perceived in its perpetual 
turning away: a specter rather than a specular image. However, as La-
can continues, “when the phantom turns around, he [i.e. the subject 
Maupassant] sees that it is himself”34. With this turning of the spec-
ular image of identification and recognition into the estranging and 
spectral image of the double, one might say that the double represents 
that which had to disappear in order for me to appear in the first place 
such that when the double reappears I, in turn, am threatened with 
my own disappearance. In other words, the double constitutes a sort 
of negative autopsy in the appearance of which I see myself disappear. 
The figure of the double returns to remind me that there is some-
thing in the constitution of myself that escapes me and that there is 
something in my mirror reflection that I am prevented from seeing in 
that I only see it turning away from me in the gradual dissolution of 
myself. The double is the apparition of something more intimate to 
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me than I am to myself [interior intimo meo]; an irreducible remainder 
that threatens to disperse and dissipate me from the outside of my 
‘within.’ As such, the double is a manifestation of that ‘absolutely oth-
er’ [dissemblable], which is alien to our fellow others [semblables], and 
which Lacan in his second seminar designates as “the very image of 
dislocation, of the essential tearing apart of the subject”35. 
Turning to Blanchot and his L’écriture du désastre, we might say 
that when the double appears in the mirror, I see myself as nothing 
but a “simulated I, an imitation of nothing”36, and this imitation is 
precisely the mask that I wear in order to conceal the hollowness be-
hind it. Anxiety, in other words, has to do with a certain gaze and with 
a certain vision, which is why Lacan stresses that the object, without 
which there would be no anxiety, is the eye, that is, the organ of both 
vision and blindness37. This duplicity of vision and blindness in anx-
iety brings us to our third and final key sentence from Lacan’s tenth 
seminar before finally entering into a discussion with Blanchot.
IV. THAT WHICH DECEIVES NOT IS THE 
DREADFUL CERTAINTY OF THE OUTSIDE 
In French, Lacan’s third sentence states that “la véritable substance de 
l’angoisse, c’est le ce qui ne trompe pas, le hors de doute”38. Price trans-
lates this sentence as “the true substance of anxiety, is that which de-
ceives not, that which is entirely free of doubt”39, whereas Gallagher 
translates it as “the true substance of anxiety, the ‘what does not de-
ceive,’ what is beyond doubting”40. In the following, however, I would 
like to pursue a different, and perhaps more literal, translation of La-
can’s sentence emphasizing that ‘the true substance of anxiety’ is that 
which does not deceive, because it concerns a relation to that which is 
‘outside of doubt’ [le hors de doute] even if it is the very ‘cause of doubt’ 
[la cause du doute]. Indeed, Lacan states that doubt is a mechanism that 
arises in an attempt to avoid the appalling and dreadful certainty of 
anxiety41. 
The question is, then, how we are to conceive of this anxious 
certitude belonging to the outside of doubt. A partial answer to this 
question would be to link the outside of doubt to the outside of reality 
mentioned above, such that anxiety would be a premonition of the 
remainder of the real that falls outside of reality, but which in this very 
falling out constitutes its frame. As Lacan says, this irreducible re-
mainder usually hides in the “penumbra of symbolic effectiveness”42, 
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and perhaps it ought to have remained there in the shadows of reality. 
Nevertheless, in anxiety the irreducible real of the outside returns to 
haunt the homes of the anxious in such a manner that it exposes them 
to the heteronomy or “non-autonomy of the subject”43. On this read-
ing, anxiety would thus be signaling towards the certitude that there is 
“an outside that stands prior to a certain internalization”44, and that 
there is an anteriority of heteronomy, which precedes the grasp and 
understanding of the self-conscious and supposedly autonomous I. 
According to Lacan, anxiety therefore discloses the fact that: “There 
is no auto-analysis, even when one imagines there is. The Other is 
there”45.
 However, even though this exposure to an (archi)originary 
heterogeneity is perhaps anxiety-provoking enough as it is, it does not 
end there. Anxiety not only discloses how what I held to be my desires, 
my thoughts, or my speech, is really the desire, thought, and speech of 
the Other; anxiety also discloses how the subject of the Other’s de-
sire, as Lacan puts it, “enters the lair where it has been awaited for all 
eternity in the shape of the object that I am in so far as it exiles me from 
my subjectivity”46. Coming back to the seventeenth seminar on the 
reverse side of psychoanalysis and to the function of the ‘pas-sans,’ 
Lacan not only states that anxiety is not without an object, but also that 
we are not without a relation to the truth and then goes on to ask: 
But is it certain that we should find it [the truth] intus, within? 
Why not to one side? Heimlich, Unheimlich—each of us, from our 
reading of Freud, has been able to recall what shelters in the am-
biguity of the word which, through not being within, and yet 
evokes it, accentuates precisely everything that is strange.47
In other words, anxiety discloses the truth of reality’s strange and 
uncanny ‘outside,’ which was already there before the beginning and 
which evokes ‘an inside’ only by evading its grasp. With certainty, 
then, anxiety knows that right there where our habits of ‘conscious’ 
thinking tells us to look for ‘ourselves’—as the authors of our speech 
and writing, or as the deliberate cause of an action, a conduct, or a 
desire—that is where we should look instead, or in spite of ourselves, 
for that thing of the outside within, which supports the framing of reality 
only by escaping our specular grasp. In this regard, Lacan is of course 
appreciative of the linguistic ‘coincidence’ that the German Es and the 
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first letter of the subject are homophones,x since it allows him to show 
how anxiety exposes the subject as the very object that is not lacking. 
The certainty of anxiety beyond doubt thus concerns a certain 
reversal of the mirror stage whereby, as Lacan says in his second sem-
inar, the “[v]ision of anxiety, the identification of anxiety, [would be] 
the final revelation of you are this—You are this, which is so far from you, this 
which is the ultimate formlessness”48. Anxiety is an encounter with myself 
as an ‘it’ or as a strange and disorganized ‘thing,’ which is an encoun-
ter that is always missed [dystychia] because it is an encounter with a 
‘formlessness of the flesh’ over which I have no authority or ownership 
since “there is no longer anyone who can say I”49. Nonetheless, this 
always missed encounter can come to fascinate and possess the subject 
like the petrifying gaze of Medusa in a sort of blind vision, which, as 
Blanchot writes in L’espace littéraire, “is no longer the possibility of 
seeing, but rather the impossibility of not seeing”50.
Hence, anxiety is the cause of doubt because it makes the limits 
of our reality tremble with the threatening premonition that the un-
representable, unimaginable, unthinkable, and inappropriable, or in 
short ‘the real,’ might come to perforate and penetrate our horizons of 
possibility and let the impossible happen. Doubt is a mechanism suc-
ceeding anxiety insofar as it is an attempt to restore the limits of what 
can reasonably be expected by discriminating between the certain and 
the uncertain, the known and the unknown, the likely and the unlike-
ly. However, anxiety exposes the blindness of this wanting to know, 
which causes Oedipus to tear out his eyes only to become a seer with 
the particular kind of certainty that only anxiety can achieve. In this 
regard, Lacan remarks that anxiety does not concern the possibility of 
tearing out one’s eyes, but rather “the impossible sight that threatens 
you, of your own eyes lying on the ground”51 – a blind sight, no doubt, 
but nonetheless a sight that is not without seeing.
Once again, this blind vision of anxiety indicates another limit 
point where Lacan’s discourse touches upon Blanchot’s writing, and 
where psychoanalysis approaches the space of literature. For anxiety 
x  Phonetically the German ‘Es’ is indistinguishable from the letter ‘S,’ 
which, according to Lacanian algebra, signifies the immemorial and mythical 
subject, which was made to disappear in the originary cut of the signifier, 
and which can only return as the originally repressed remainder of the barred 
subject. In other words, the homophonic pair Es/S designates the subject of 
the unconscious, which is a “subject devoid of any das or other objectifying 
article” (Lacan 1955: 347/417). 
80
does not come to an end with this mortifying vision of one’s eyes 
on the ground. It continues to the point where one could even say 
that anxiety is a relation with the impossibility of ending, that is, with 
what Blanchot calls ‘the incessant’.xi Yet, the incessant is precisely that 
which unendingly resists relation, which makes anxiety an impossible 
relation, or, in Lacan’s words, an “abyssal relation to that which is 
most unknown”52. Perhaps, this relating to non-relation is what re-
lates the art of psychoanalysis to the art of literature since, as Blanchot 
says, the ‘relation without relation’ is precisely what “links inspiration 
to desire”53. Moreover, this shared destiny—or rather destinerrance un-
derstood as an interminable destiny initially deprived of direction—
of maintaining a relation with that which escapes relation is perhaps 
what impels both Blanchot and Lacan to compare their work with 
that of Orpheus’ descent into Hades in his attempt to retrieve Eury-
dice from the land of the deceased. According to Blanchot, Orpheus’ 
quest consists precisely in a passion for inspiration—a passion, more-
over, which Lacan would perhaps call a death drive, which is ultimately 
the drive of all drives.xii Thus, in his eleventh seminar, Lacan resorts to 
mythology since, as he says, “we have, in Eurydice twice lost, the most 
potent image we can find of the relation between Orpheus the analyst 
and the unconscious”54. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note what Lacan says of the un-
canny, namely, that “[i]n reality, this experience is too fleeting. Fiction 
demonstrates it much better”55. However, as Lacan also tells us in his 
eleventh seminar the always framed ‘reality,’ is that which we wake up 
to only in order to keep dreaming and thus to avoid the traumatic ker-
nel of the real, which approaches us only by turning away in our sleep. 
In other words, fiction has a more intimate relation with the non-rela-
xi  In L’entretien infini Blanchot writes that ‘the incessant’ names what 
“imposes upon us the idea that nothing has ever truly begun, having from 
the beginning begun by beginning again—thereby destroying the myth of the 
initial or the original, to which we remain unreflectively subject—and tying 
speech to the neutral movement of what has neither beginning nor end” (1969: 
343/503). This reminds us of Lacan’s myth of the lamella, which designates 
the immortality of the drives, which was lost already prior to the process of 
meiosis, and which Lacan offers as a sort of counter-myth to Aristophanes’ 
myth of the original hermaphrodite who was complete before the mortal rift of 
sexual differentiation. Cf. 1964: 179ff./197ff.
xii  In Seminar 11, Lacan refers to Heraclitus’ fragment “the bow [βιός] is 
called life [βίος], but its work is death” (Diels 1903: B48), and he correlates it 
with his own theory according to which all drives are ultimately driven by their 
own end. 
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tional ‘real’ than ‘reality’ proper, which is one way of conceiving how 
“truth shows itself [s’avére] in a fictional structure”56. 
This is perhaps one reason why Blanchot’s writing of the neuter 
appears to follow Orpheus’s passion more closely than Lacan’s psy-
choanalytic discourse regarding this ‘outside within,’ since Blanchot 
does not stop at its anxious exposure, which would be to stop at what 
he calls ‘the first night’ [la première nuit]. Instead, alongside Orpheus, 
Blanchot descends into what he calls ‘the other night’ [l’autre nuit] 
or simply ‘the outside’ [le dehors] by the strange movement, the step-
not-beyond [pas au-delà], which at the same time allows and forbids 
the passage to the outside. Through this passage of passion, Blanchot 
makes us experience another turn to the Lacanian reversal of the mir-
ror stage understood as the appearance of disappearance, which con-
sists in the inability, in turn, of this appearance to disappear, and this 
further turn is where the writing of the neuter makes itself apparent 
as the only author there is. As Blanchot explains: “Literature is that 
experience through which the consciousness discovers its being in its 
inability to lose consciousness […] it is re-created beyond uncon-
sciousness as an impersonal spontaneity”57. In L’espace littéraire, Blan-
chot depicts the transition from the first to the other night as follows:
  
The first night is welcoming. Novalis addresses hymns to it. Of it 
one can say, in the night, as if it had an intimacy. We enter into 
the night and we rest there, sleeping and dying. But the other 
night does not welcome, does not open. In it one is still outside 
[…] The other night is always the other, and he who senses it be-
comes the other. He who approaches it departs from himself, is 
no longer he who approaches but he who turns away, goes hith-
er and yon [...]. But the echo sends this step back to him as the 
whispering immensity, the void is now a presence coming toward 
him.”58
Hence, ‘the other night’ or the ‘outside’ of which anxiety is certain, 
designates an oppressing vastness entirely deprived of intimacy, and 
therefore belongs to an experience without any personal subject, that 
is, an experience of anonymity in both the subjective and objective 
genitive—that is, an experience which strictly speaking belongs to no 
one, which is an experience of what Blanchot, in contrast to a ‘mun-
dane solitude,’ calls the ‘essential solitude’.  In approaching the outside 
of this essential solitude, I do not approach a more intimate, personal, 
82
or profound essence of myself; instead, I am approached by something 
that “is not my being a little less myself, but rather something which 
there is ‘behind me,’ and which this ‘me’ conceals in order to come 
into its own”59. Thus, similar to the ‘I’s originary masking of the Laca-
nian subject’s duplicitous origins, what this Blanchotian ‘me’ conceals 
in its worldly solitude is precisely “the solitude of non-interiority, ex-
posure to the outside, boundless dispersion [dispersion hors cloture], the 
impossibility of holding firm, within bounds, enclosed [l’impossibilité 
de se tenir ferme, fermé]”60.
V. CLOSING: WHO APPEARS TO DISAPPEAR? 
Nearing the end, I would like to stress once again that anxiety, un-
derstood here as the signal or premonition of a reversal of the mirror 
stage, is a limit experience. In fact, if we recall that the term ‘experience’ 
comes from the Latin experiri, which designates both a testing and a 
traversal of danger [periculum], but which, according to its Greek root, 
πέρας or πείρω, also designates a going to, a running through, a piercing or 
a transgression of a limit, then anxiety would seem to be an experience 
par excellence. In the context of Lacan and Blanchot, we might then 
think the limit experience of anxiety as a going beyond the limits of ‘re-
ality,’ a going to the other or reverse side, or finally, as a going towards 
the outside, and this approach of the inapproachable would designate 
the shared experience of literature and psychoanalysis.  
Already in his first seminar, Lacan states that psychoanalysis 
aims at a deconstruction of imaginary formations, such that what 
occurs at the end of an analysis concerns “a twilight, an imaginary 
decline of the world, and even an experience at the limit of deperson-
alization”61. Moreover, this experience occurs in what Lacan with ex-
plicit reference to Freud’s psychoanalytic imperative calls “a genuine 
reversal [renversement], a displacement, like a minuet executed by the 
ego and the id”62. As I have tried to show throughout this essay, the 
space of both analysis and literature would seem to open up to an anx-
ious experience of the precarious limits of reality upholding not only 
the demarcations between the I and the It, the personal and the im-
personal, and the familiar and the foreign, but also—as with Antigone 
approaching the limit of her Até—the demarcation between desire and 
jouissance, as the separation between one death and an other death63. 
Yet how can we traverse this limit of depersonalization without 
thereby ceasing to experience all together? Who remains either at the 
twilight of analysis or in writing of the neuter to experience the ap-
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pearance of his or her own disappearance? There still seems to be a 
perspective at stake in this seeing oneself disappear within the de-
teriorating frame of reality – but is it still a first-person perspective? 
According to Lacan, an answer to this question of ‘the who,’ which is 
also a question that Blanchot’s poses,xiii is already given with the signal 
of anxiety. For, as Lacan explains: 
If the ego is the locus of the signal, then the signal isn’t given 
for the ego […]. In principle, it doesn’t address me as someone 
here in the present, it addresses me, if you like, as expected and 
far more still as lost. It solicits my loss, so that the Other can find 
itself there again. That’s what anxiety is64.
Otherwise put, the signal mediated through the anxious ‘I’, who only 
comes to supplement itself in the place of an Other, is addressed to the 
originally repressed S that is phonetically indistinguishable from the 
Freudian Es, and which rhymes with what Lacan elsewhere calls the 
“prehistoric Other that is impossible to forget”65. Impossible to forget, 
indeed, but also impossible to remember since it has never been pres-
ent otherwise than as the trace of the originally repressed and, as such, 
it remains immemorial. 
In this regard, we might take heed of Lacan’s suggestion in the 
essay “Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l’inconscient 
freudien,” that the only improper signifier of the enunciating subject 
is the negation or the ‘ne’ of every proper signifier, and that the ‘real 
subject’ is therefore only to be found in the interdiction of discourse. 
As such, the ‘real subject’ only announces itself as “[a]n enunciation 
that denounces itself, as statement that renounces itself, an igno-
rance that sweeps itself away [se dissipe], an opportunity that self-de-
structs”66. On this view, might we not read the triple negation of the 
French phrase “l’angoisse n’est pas sans l’objet” as saying that the ob-
ject without which anxiety is not, is, in fact, the subject as it disap-
pears in the very appearance of its signifier? In other words, might we 
not take at least one of the certainties about which anxiety does 
not deceive to concern the “lethal factor” of language, which en-
tails that, “the I comes on the scene as a subject who is conjugated 
with the double aporia of a veritable subsistence that is abolished by 
xiii  As the title of Blanchot’s essay ”Qui?” indicates, it concerns precisely 
this question of the ‘who’ (Blanchot 1989).
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his knowledge, and by a discourse in which it is death that sustains 
existence”67. 
Returning to Blanchot one final time, we have seen how he as-
sociates literature and writing with an outside without intimacy that 
undoes any personal relation and with the essential solitude of the 
impersonal to which anxiety exposes its subjects. Commenting on the 
experience of Mallarmé in whose writing the impersonal comes to 
language, Blanchot remarks: “We have seen that this language does 
not imply anyone who expresses it, or anyone who hears it: it speaks 
itself and writes itself. That is the condition of its authority”68. In oth-
er words, the writing of literature is not the result or the representa-
tion of the writer’s intentions, thoughts, or wishes; on the contrary, 
it is the writing that demands and puts its claim on the writer who, 
in turn, remains strangely distanced from the automatic autonomy of 
the written. Nevertheless, as Paul de Man points out, the writer still 
remains as a witness of his or her own process of impersonalization 
throughout the writing in which “the will to consciousness keeps as-
serting itself, even from beyond the catastrophic event in which it was 
destroyed”69. Accordingly, in the first part of Faux pas entitled “De 
l’angoisse au langage,” Blanchot gives prominence to the experience 
of the writer with regard to responding to the question of the ‘who’ 
that remains in anxiety: 
The existence of the writer brings with it the proof that, in the 
same individual, alongside the anguished being subsists a be-
ing of cold blood; alongside the mad, a reasonable being; and, 
close-coupled with a mute who has lost all words, a master of 
rhetoric. The case of the writer is privileged because it represents 
the paradox of anxiety in a privileged way. Anxiety calls into 
question all the realities of reason, its methods, its possibilities, 
its possibility, its purposes, and yet it forces reason to be there; 
it compels reason to function as perfectly as it can. Anxiety itself 
is possible only because in all its power there remains the faculty 
that it annihilates and makes impossible70.
By way of closing, then, we might say that the passage from the first 
night to the night of the essential solitude belonging to the outside, 
which can be experienced in the anxiousness of both analysis and writ-
ing, may be discerned as a shifting or indeed a reversal of perspec-
tives. Speaking in psychoanalytic terms, the perspective of the ‘other 
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night’ is no longer that of the anxious ‘I’ who trembles in the elusive 
approach of the foreign alterity that threatens its organization from 
within. Rather, the other night is where the ‘I’ gazes blindly at its own 
disappearance from the impersonal perspective of the outside already 
within itself. For, as Blanchot says, almost as if in response to Freud’s 
psychoanalytic dictum: 
“Where I am alone, I am not there; no one is there,  
but the impersonal is”. 
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